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NIFLA and the Construction of Compelled Speech Doctrine
ROBERT POST*
First Amendment doctrine disfavoring compelled speech originated in 1943 in West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette. There are good and convincing
explanations for the Court’s decision in Barnette, but the Court’s recent expansion
of the doctrine, culminating in National Institute of Family & Life Advocates
(NIFLA) v. Becerra, holds that compelled speech is in most instances “contentbased” regulation requiring heightened judicial scrutiny.
Using examples ranging from professional malpractice to compulsory tax
returns, this Article argues that the doctrinal rule of NIFLA is demonstrably
incorrect. It suggests that the doctrinal category of “compelled speech” may itself
be confused insofar as it imagines that all legal obligations to communicate are
equally disfavored under the Constitution. Courts should scrutinize instances of
compelled speech as necessary to protect threatened constitutional values, but the
presence of these values will vary depending upon social context.
Courts must learn to read the constitutional geography implicit in distinct social
landscapes. This Article offers some hints for how this might be done. Applying these
insights to NIFLA, the Article argues that the outcome of the case actually depended
upon preconscious and undefended suppositions about social context. Constitutional
decisions like NIFLA can be made persuasive only if such suppositions are made
explicit and justified.
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In recent years the Court has become increasingly aggressive in using compelled
speech doctrine to strike down statutes under the First Amendment.1 But the doctrine,
as has frequently been noted, is haphazard, inconsistent, and in some respects
incoherent.2 The academy has responded by renewing its efforts to systematize the
doctrine to endow it with shape and substance.3
It is now plain, for example, that the Court’s first easy equation of “the right to
speak freely” with “the right to refrain from speaking at all”4 is far too glib. The
Court has itself explicitly acknowledged this point in the context of commercial
speech. In Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel,5 the Court held that the
constitutionality of restrictions on commercial speech should be decided using the
elevated scrutiny of the four-part Central Hudson test,6 whereas mandated

1. See, e.g., Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. (NIFLA) v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361
(2018); Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018);
see also Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civ. Rts. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1740 (2018)
(Thomas, J., concurring in part).
2. Vikram David Amar & Alan Brownstein, Toward a More Explicit, Independent,
Consistent and Nuanced Compelled Speech Doctrine, 2020 ILL. L. REV. 1, 6; Seana Valentine
Shiffrin, Compelled Speech and the Irrelevance of Controversy, 47 PEPP. L. REV. 731, 735–36
(2020); Clay Calvert, Wither Zauderer, Blossom Heightened Scrutiny? How the Supreme
Court’s 2018 Rulings in Becerra and Janus Exacerbate Problems with Compelled-Speech
Jurisprudence, 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1395, 1399 (2019); Martin H. Redish, Compelled
Commercial Speech and the First Amendment, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1749, 1750 (2019);
Eugene Volokh, The Law of Compelled Speech, 97 TEX. L. REV. 355, 357 (2018).
3. See, e.g., supra note 2; R. George Wright, The Compelled Commercial Speech Cases:
Why Not Just Flip a Coin, 71 MERCER L. REV. 585 (2020); Erwin Chemerinsky & Michele
Goodwin, Constitutional Gerrymandering Against Abortion Rights: NIFLA v. Becerra, 94.
N.Y.U. L. REV. 61 (2019); Lauren Fowler, The “Uncontroversial” Controversy in Compelled
Commercial Disclosures, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1651 (2019); Sarah C. Haan, The Post-Truth
First Amendment, 94 IND. L. J. 1351 (2019); Redish, supra note 2; William Baude & Eugene
Volokh, Compelled Subsidies and the First Amendment, 132 HARV. L. REV. 171 (2018); Abner
S. Greene, “Not in My Name” Claims of Constitutional Right, 98 B.U. L. REV. 1475 (2018);
Jonathan H. Adler, Compelled Commercial Speech and the Consumer “Right to Know,” 58
ARIZ. L. REV. 421 (2016); Caroline Mala Corbin, Compelled Disclosures, 65 ALA. L. REV.
1277 (2014); Toni M. Massaro, Tread on Me!, 17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 365, 404–15 (2014);
Steven H. Shiffrin, What is Wrong with Compelled Speech?¸ 29 J.L. & POL. 499 (2014); G.
Edward White, The Evolution of First Amendment Protection for Compelled Commercial
Speech, 29 J.L. & POL. 481 (2014); Gregory Klass, The Very Idea of a First Amendment Right
Against Compelled Subsidization, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1087 (2005); Note, The Curious
Relationship Between the Compelled Speech and Government Speech Doctrines, 117 HARV.
L. REV. 2411 (2004). I have contributed a bit to this literature: Robert Post, Compelled
Commercial Speech, 117 W. VA. L. REV. 867 (2015); Robert Post, Informed Consent to
Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis of Compelled Physician Speech, 2007 ILL. L. REV. 939;
Robert Post, Compelled Subsidization of Speech: Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Association,
2005 SUP. CT. REV. 195; Robert Post, Transparent and Efficient Markets: Compelled
Commercial Speech and Coerced Commercial Association in United Foods, Zauderer, and
Abood, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 555 (2006).
4. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977).
5. 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
6. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566
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commercial disclosures of “purely factual and uncontroversial information”7 are
constitutional so long as they are “reasonably related” to an appropriate state
interest.8 The asymmetry follows from the fact that the constitutional value of
commercial speech inheres in its “informational function.”9 Restrictions on
commercial speech impede this function whereas the mandated disclosure of
commercial information advances it.10
Zauderer is a foundational decision. Among other implications, it signifies that
the constitutional values at stake in compelled speech cases differ depending upon
social context. Zauderer challenges us to unpack these distinct contexts and to

(1980):
In commercial speech cases, then, a four-part analysis has developed. At the
outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First
Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least
must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the
asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive
answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly advances the
governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is
necessary to serve that interest.
Zauderer applied the Central Hudson test to the restrictions on commercial speech at issue in
the case.
7. 471 U.S. at 651.
8. Id. For an explication of the Court’s reasoning, see Post, Compelled Commercial
Speech, supra note 3, at 877–79, 882–83.
9. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563 (“The First Amendment’s concern for commercial
speech is based on the informational function of advertising.”).
10. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 650–51:
Appellant, however, overlooks material differences between disclosure
requirements and outright prohibitions on speech. In requiring attorneys who
advertise their willingness to represent clients on a contingent-fee basis to state
that the client may have to bear certain expenses even if he loses, Ohio has not
attempted to prevent attorneys from conveying information to the public; it has
only required them to provide somewhat more information than they might
otherwise be inclined to present. We have, to be sure, held that in some instances
compulsion to speak may be as violative of the First Amendment as prohibitions
on speech. . . .
But the interests at stake in this case are not of the same order as those discussed
in Wooley, Tornillo, and Barnette. Ohio has not attempted to “prescribe what
shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or
force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.” 319 U.S., at 642. The
State has attempted only to prescribe what shall be orthodox in commercial
advertising, and its prescription has taken the form of a requirement that appellant
include in his advertising purely factual and uncontroversial information about
the terms under which his services will be available. Because the extension of
First Amendment protection to commercial speech is justified principally by the
value to consumers of the information such speech provides, appellant’s
constitutionally protected interest in not providing any particular factual
information in his advertising is minimal.
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explain the particular First Amendment values that compelled speech doctrine may
be summoned to protect in various circumstances.11
Contrast, for example, the Court’s first two major compelled speech decisions. In
1943, the Court decided West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,12 the
original and undoubtedly most eloquent of the Court’s compelled speech opinions.
At issue in Barnette was West Virginia’s requirement that school children begin each
day by reciting a pledge of allegiance to the flag, accompanied by “the ‘stiff-arm’
salute, the saluter to keep the right hand raised with palm turned up.”13 Justice
Jackson’s opinion for the Court made plain that the case was not merely about
compelled speech, but also about a forced pledge, a “compulsion of students to
declare a belief.”14 A compulsion of this nature threatens a very specific
constitutional value, which has been powerfully summarized by Seana Shiffrin in her
explication of what she calls “a thinker-centered approach” to the First
Amendment.15 This value is compromised whenever the state “objectionably
interfere[s] with the free development and operation of a person’s mind.”16 The
compulsory pledge in Barnette is a textbook case of such interference:
Requiring potentially insincere recitation, and especially rote and
periodic recitation, poses constitutional problems because it utilizes
disrespectful methods of communication and persuasion. These methods
constitute efforts forcibly to inculcate and to instill rather than to
persuade through direct, transparent arguments, reasons, or even direct,
transparent emotional appeals. By employing such disrespectful
methods, the government contradicts presuppositions about moral
character that underlie the First Amendment.17
It is extremely doubtful, however, that any such interference with the
development or functioning of an independent thinker was at stake in 1977 in the

11. Larry Alexander, Compelled Speech, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 147 (2006).
12. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
13. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 628–29. The similarities to “Hitler’s” salute did not go
unnoticed. Id. at 627.
14. Id. at 631. “It is also to be noted that the compulsory flag salute and pledge requires
affirmation of a belief and an attitude of mind.” Id. at 633. The Court framed the question as
raising the “validity of the asserted power to force an American citizen publicly to profess any
statement of belief or to engage in any ceremony of assent.” Id. at 634.
15. Seana Valentine Shiffrin, A Thinker-Based Approach to Freedom of Speech, 27
CONST. COMMENT. 283 (2011).
16. Id. at 287.
17. Vincent Blasi & Seana V. Shiffrin, The Story of West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette: The Pledge of Allegiance and the Freedom of Thought, in
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 434 (Michael C. Dorf, ed., 2d ed. 2009); see Shiffrin, supra
note 15, at 302:
Compelled speech of this kind threatens (or at least aims) to interfere with free
thinking processes of the speaker/listener and to influence mental content in ways
and through methods that are illicit: nontransparent, via repetition, and through
coercive manipulation of a character virtue, namely that of sincerity, that itself is
closely connected to commitments of freedom of speech.
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Court’s second major compelled speech decision, Wooley v. Maynard.18 Wooley
involved a challenge to the coerced display of license plates stamped with the New
Hampshire state motto: “Live Free or Die.”19 The litigant in Wooley, a Jehovah’s
Witness named George Maynard, objected to putting a license plate with this motto
on his car. He did not allege that he had been required to “declare a belief”; he did
not allege that he had been compelled insincerely to repeat what he did not believe
to be true. He complained instead that he had been forced “into advertising a slogan
which I find morally, ethically, religiously and politically abhorrent.”20
The vices of iteration, inculcation, manipulation, and insincerity, identified by
Shiffrin as essential to the holding in Barnette, were almost entirely absent in Wooley.
Maynard did not allege, nor is there any reason to believe, that the independence of
his mind was undermined by the texts imprinted on his car’s license plates.21 But the
Court nevertheless sought to invoke Barnette as a precedent. To do this it articulated
a very abstract principle of constitutional law: it asserted that the “right to speak and
the right to refrain from speaking” are “complementary” concepts.22
Zauderer teaches us that this simple equation is incorrect. The Court in Wooley
nevertheless relied on this false equivalence to sidestep its obligation to explain the
exact nature of the constitutional values threatened by New Hampshire’s license
plates. Modern compelled speech doctrine thus began with a serious sin of omission.
If the purpose of a constitutional right is to safeguard specific constitutional values,
the doctrinal contours of the right cannot be responsibly fashioned without knowing
the precise constitutional values requiring protection. It is no wonder, then, that
compelled speech doctrine has overreached its proper boundaries and become
dangerously incoherent.
In cutting that doctrine down to size, our first task must be to ascertain the exact
constitutional values that compelled speech doctrine ought to be fashioned to protect.
The text and original meaning of the First Amendment are unfortunately not going
to provide much helpful guidance. The text of the amendment is opaque. It says
merely that “the freedom of speech” will not be abridged.23 From the time of the First
Amendment’s ratification until about two decades into the twentieth century, federal
courts equated “the freedom of speech” with Blackstone’s interpretation of press

18. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
19. Id. at 706.
20. Id. at 713.
21. See supra text accompanying note 20. Shiffrin herself seems to disagree with this
conclusion. Blasi & Shiffrin, supra note 17, at 444–45; Seana Valentine Shiffrin, What Is
Really Wrong with Compelled Association, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 839, 854 (2005). Yet unlike the
children in Barnette, who were forced every day publicly to affirm to be true what they did
not believe to be true, the litigant in Wooley was not forced to affirm anything. He was merely
required to use his “private property as a ‘mobile billboard’ for the State’s ideological
message.” Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715. There does not seem to be a convincing connection
between what is written on my license plate and my individual “freedom of thought and mental
autonomy,” Shiffrin, supra, at 854, which Shiffrin places at the core of her “thinker-based
approach,” Shiffrin, supra note 15. One might as well say that the free development of my
mind is impaired by the required texts on my passport, or on my driver’s license, or on the
dollar bills that I carry every day in my wallet.
22. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714.
23. U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
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freedom:24 “The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state;
but this consists in laying no previous restraints upon publications, and not in
freedom from censure for criminal matter when published.”25 As late as 1907 the
Court could assert that “the main purpose” of the First Amendment was “‘to prevent
all such previous restraints upon publications as had been practiced by other
governments,’ and they do not prevent the subsequent punishment of such as may be
deemed contrary to the public welfare.”26
If text and original meaning are no guide, how should we interpret the proper
reach of the compelled speech doctrine? Perhaps we might best approach this delicate
and complex question by hypothesizing concrete examples of compelled speech
about whose constitutionality or unconstitutionality we generally agree; we can then
generalize the pattern formed by these examples, after which we can test and reevaluate our generalizations by postulating new hypothetical examples; we can then
modify our initial generalizations in light of these new examples; and so forth and so
on, ad infinitum. We might, in other words, develop the First Amendment doctrine

24. The Court has instructed us that “it has always been widely understood that the Second
Amendment, like the First and Fourth Amendments, codified a pre-existing right,” and that in
such circumstances the Court has looked to the writings of William Blackstone, whose works
“constituted the preeminent authority on English law for the founding generation.” District of
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592–94 (2008). Heller rightly notes that it was not until
1931 that “this Court first held a law to violate the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom
of speech . . . almost 150 years after the Amendment was ratified.” Id. at 625–26.
25. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 151 (Boston,
T.B. Wait & Sons 1818); see JOSEPH STORY, 3 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 731–37 (Boston, Hillard, Gray & Co. 1833). Story waxed eloquent on the
limited reach of the First Amendment:
That this amendment was intended to secure to every citizen an absolute right to
speak, or write, or print, whatever he might please, without responsibility, public
or private, therefor, is a supposition too wild to be indulged by any rational man.
This would be to allow to every citizen a right to destroy, at his pleasure, the
reputation, the peace, the property and even the personal safety of every other
citizen. . . . Civil society could not go on under such circumstances. Men would
then be obliged to resort to private vengeance, to make up for the deficiencies of
the law . . . . It is plain, then, that the language of this amendment imports no
more, than that every man shall have a right to speak, write, and print his opinions
upon any subject whatsoever, without prior restraint, so always, that he does not
injure any other person in his rights, person, property, or reputation, and so
always, that he does not thereby disturb the public peace, or attempt to subvert
the government.
Id. at 732. Story quotes Blackstone with approval: “Every freeman has an undoubted right to
lay what sentiments he pleases before the public . . . . But, if he publishes what is improper,
mischievous, or illegal, he must take the consequences of his own temerity.” Id. at 736; see
BLACKSTONE, supra, at 151.
26. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907) (per Holmes, J.); see ROBERT POST,
CITIZENS DIVIDED: CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM AND THE CONSTITUTION 38–39 (2014); DAVID
M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS (1997). On Holmes’s invention of modern
First Amendment doctrine in November 1919, see Robert Post, Writing the Dissent in Abrams,
51 SETON HALL L. REV. 21 (2021).
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of compelled speech by using the old-fashioned common law method employed by
British and American courts for centuries.27
I know that certain Justices are methodologically opposed to conflating
constitutional interpretation and the common law method.28 Yet, in the context of the
First Amendment, we do not seem to have any alternative. The text and original
meaning of the Amendment have abandoned us to our best instincts and precedents.
Since we are dealing with constitutional restraints on laws and policies that are
produced by democratically responsive institutions, and since we face uncertainty
about when and why compelled speech might threaten constitutional values, courts
would be well advised to approach this process with caution. They ought to confine
their decisions to the specific circumstances of particular cases until they can
confidently venture more abstract generalizations.
Unfortunately this is not the path that Supreme Court has chosen to pursue, and
the consequences, as one might have predicted, have been truly dreadful.29 In this
brief talk, I shall take as my example the Court’s recent decision in National Institute
of Family & Life Advocates (NIFLA) v. Becerra.30 NIFLA concerned the California
Reproductive Freedom, Accountability, Comprehensive Care, and Transparency
(FACT) Act,31 which, to speak quickly and roughly, required “crisis pregnancy
centers (CPCs) to provide notices to women that visit their clinics that California
provides free or low-cost reproductive health services. The law also mandated that
unlicensed CPCs notify women that California had not licensed the clinics to provide
medical services.”32 CPCs are typically associated with political or religious
organizations “whose stated goal is to prevent women from accessing abortions.”33
Writing for a Court of five, Justice Thomas held that FACT was a “content-based
regulation of speech” because it compelled “individuals to speak a particular
message.”34 Thomas held that “as a general matter” content-based regulations “are
presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified only if the government proves
that they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests.”35 Thomas
declined to apply strict scrutiny, however, because “the licensed notice cannot
survive even intermediate scrutiny.”36

27. David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877
(1996).
28. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW
(1997).
29. For an overall indictment of the Court’s recent decision-making in the area of
compelled speech, see Alexander Tsesis, Compelled Speech and Proportionality, 97 IND. L. J.
811 (2022).
30. 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
31. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 123470–123473 (West 2018).
32. Chemerinsky & Goodwin, supra note 3, at 63.
33. Id. at 70.
34. NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2371.
35. Id. In an opinion joined by Justice Thomas, Justice Gorsuch has remarked that “[t]he
whole point of strict scrutiny is to test the government’s assertions, and our precedents make
plain that it has always been a demanding and rarely satisfied standard.” S. Bay United
Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 716, 718 (2021) (Gorsuch, J.).
36. NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2375.
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NIFLA is not a modest opinion. It strives to enunciate general and abstract rules
of constitutional law. Although Thomas has often professed to be bound by
eighteenth century text and meanings,37 none of the doctrinal rules announced in
NIFLA can in any way be traced to these sources.38 They are entirely modern
constructions that purport to bring comprehensive order to the field of compelled
speech.
I shall focus on two aspects of these rules. First, NIFLA categorizes government
compelled speech as “content-based regulation” insofar as it requires “individuals to
speak a particular message.” Content-based regulation is subject to elevated scrutiny,
which NIFLA describes as typically strict scrutiny,39 but which it also indicates
should at a minimum be intermediate scrutiny.40 Second, NIFLA asserts that courts
ought to assess the constitutionality of government-mandated speech by using an
approach that employs tiers of scrutiny. Tiers-of-scrutiny doctrine does not engage
relevant First Amendment values but instead characteristically queries whether a rule
is over- or underinclusive.41 We have become so inured to shapeless doctrine of this

37. See United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 140 S. Ct. 1575, 1583 (2020) (Thomas, J.,
concurring); McKee v. Cosby, 139 S. Ct. 675 (2019); Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S.
786, 821 (2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
38. “The words ‘strict judicial scrutiny’ appear nowhere in the U.S. Constitution. Neither
is there any textual basis, nor any foundation in the Constitution’s original understanding, for
the modern test under which legislation will be upheld against constitutional challenge only if
‘necessary’ or ‘narrowly tailored’ to promote a ‘compelling’ governmental interest.” Richard
H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1268 (2007).
39. See, e.g., Barr v. Am. Ass’n of Pol. Consultants, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 2335, 2347 (2020)
(“Under the Court’s precedents, a ‘law that is content based’ is ‘subject to strict scrutiny.’”);
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 165 (2015); United States v. Playboy Ent. Grp., Inc.,
529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (“Since § 505 is a content-based speech restriction, it can stand only
if it satisfies strict scrutiny.”).
40. NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2375.
41. Strict scrutiny “requires the Government to prove that the restriction furthers a
compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.” Reed v. Town of Gilbert,
Ariz., 576 U.S. 155, 171 (2015). The Court has offered many formulations for intermediate
scrutiny, but a typical passage asks if state regulation “advances important governmental
interests unrelated to the suppression of free speech and does not burden substantially more
speech than necessary to further those interests.” Holder v. Humanitarian L. Project, 561 U.S.
1, 26–27 (2010). See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 661–62 (1994). In its
wisdom, the Court has in recent years in First Amendment cases invented new and apparently
distinct tiers of scrutiny, some of which do not focus so exclusively on over- and underinclusiveness, but none of which require courts directly to confront relevant First Amendment
values. For example, in Janus v. American Federation of State, County, & Municipal
Employees, Council 31, the Court announced that in the context of compelled subsidization of
speech—a topic that I do not discuss in this short paper but that I do evaluate in Post,
Compelled Subsidization of Speech, supra note 3—courts ought to apply “‘exacting’ scrutiny,”
a “less demanding test than the ‘strict’ scrutiny that might be thought to apply outside the
commercial sphere.” Janus instructs us that the test for “exacting” scrutiny is that “a compelled
subsidy must ‘serve a compelling state interest that cannot be achieved through means
significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms.’” 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2465 (2018). See
McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 572 U.S. 185, 197 (2014). In Citizens United v. FEC,
558 U.S. 310, 366 (2010), the Court offered a different definition of “exacting scrutiny,” which
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kind that it comes as something of a shock to realize that in Barnette Jackson did not
ask whether the compelled flag salute was “narrowly tailored.” He did not fret about
what tier of scrutiny to apply. Instead, he asked simply whether, given relevant First
Amendment values, a compulsory flag salute could be justified.
The first and most far-reaching doctrinal innovation of NIFLA is to equate
compelled speech with disfavored content-based regulation. How might we evaluate
the desirability of such a blunt doctrinal rule? My suggestion is simple. We should
use the technique that every law school teaches in its first year. We should imagine
two or three situations in which our intuitions about the constitutionality of
compelled speech are clear, and we should use these situations to test the reach and
force of NIFLA’s proposed rule.
Suppose, for example, that Sam visits his doctor because of an injury to his leg.
Sam’s doctor fails to instruct him to schedule a follow-up visit to check for a possible
infection. Infection does set in, and Sam unfortunately loses his leg. We know that
Sam’s leg would not have been amputated if his doctor had given him proper advice.
Sam therefore sues his doctor for malpractice, alleging that his doctor had violated
relevant medical standards of competence.42
I construct this example precisely because it is so prosaic and unexceptional.
Notice, however, that it involves compulsory speech. The doctor’s liability depends
upon his failure to communicate “a particular message” that he was under a legal
obligation to express. The imposition of this duty is an example of what NIFLA
condemns as content-based regulation. Should this perfectly ordinary application of
basic medical malpractice law be subject to the strict or intermediate constitutional
scrutiny we associate with disfavored content-based regulation?43

it said should apply to “disclaimer and disclosure requirements”: “The Court has subjected
these requirements to ‘exacting scrutiny,’ which requires a ‘substantial relation’ between the
disclosure requirement and a ‘sufficiently important’ governmental interest.” See John Doe
No. 1 v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 196 (2010). Most recently, the Court has held that “while exacting
scrutiny does not require that disclosure regimes be the least restrictive means of achieving
their ends, it does require that they be narrowly tailored to the government’s asserted purpose.”
Ams. for Prosperity Found. v. Bonta, 141 S. Ct. 2373, 2383 (2021). Still other definitions of
“exacting scrutiny” may be found in Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 575 U.S. 433, 442 (2015).
The Court has also referred to, but not exactly defined, something called “heightened
scrutiny,” Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 571 (2011), and in Holder v. Humanitarian
Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010), the Court referred to some unspecified and unlabeled tier of
scrutiny that was more than intermediate but less than strict. But see McCullen v. Coakley,
576 U.S. 464, 478 (2014) (inferring that the law in Holder survived “strict scrutiny”).
42. See, e.g., Malone v. La. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Res., 569 So. 2d 1098 (La. Ct. App.
1990).
43. NIFLA seems fundamentally confused about how it wishes to conceptualize a
hypothetical like this. On the one hand, it sneers at the possibility that “professional speech”
might constitute “a separate category of speech” that might merit less rigorous constitutional
review. “Speech is not unprotected merely because it is uttered by ‘professionals.’” NIFLA,
138 S. Ct. at 2371–72. NIFLA invokes the “marketplace of ideas” as a constitutional value that
ought to give full protection to professional speech. Id. at 2374–75. It thus echoes lower court
decisions that have brought elevated scrutiny to bear on state regulations of doctors’
professional communications with their patients, on the ground that “speech is speech, and it
must be analyzed as such for purposes of the First Amendment.” Wollschlaeger v. Governor,
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My guess is that most would resist the conclusion that large swaths of state
medical malpractice law should be constitutionalized. Lawyers, of course, deal with
their clients entirely through the medium of speech. Most would probably agree that
lawyers who commit malpractice by violating their affirmative duties to speak should
not be able to assert First Amendment immunity from liability.44 The same would
hold true of accountants.45 In fact, malpractice actions involving mandated
professional speech proceed every day without anyone so much as raising a First
Amendment question of compelled speech.
Take a different example. Suppose Amy is a witness in a trial and suppose that an
attorney is interrogating Amy in ways that Amy would rather not answer. Imagine
that Amy has no legal excuse for failing to respond to these questions; Amy has no
viable claim of privilege. If Amy nevertheless refuses to answer, and if the judge
places Amy in civil contempt in an effort to compel Amy to give testimony, is the
government engaged in content-based regulation that merits elevated constitutional
scrutiny?46 Courts constantly compel the speech of witnesses, parties, and lawyers.
Courts require that such persons speak particular messages; namely, that they provide
whatever information they have in response to the specific questions they have been
asked. Except in very unusual cases, no one even thinks to raise a First Amendment
question of compelled speech.
It is literally child’s play to think of examples where government compels speech,
but where NIFLA’s rule is not invoked and nobody would think it a good idea if it
were. If the President fires the Secretary of State for failing to issue a statement
supportive of the President, should that decision receive elevated judicial scrutiny
under the First Amendment?47 Should a court use elevated scrutiny to review the

State of Florida, 848 F.3d 1293, 1307 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (quoting King v. Governor
of N.J., 767 F.3d 216, 229 (3d Cir. 2014)). On the other hand, NIFLA gives a free pass to
“[l]ongstanding torts for professional malpractice” that regulate “professional conduct.” 138
S. Ct. at 2373. It is impossible to know what NIFLA might mean by this baffling invocation
of the notoriously vague and indeterminate speech/conduct distinction. When a doctor gives
advice to a patient, in writing or orally, is his speech “speech”? Or is it conduct? And how
would we know the difference? In the end, NIFLA is content to leave the question in a state of
explicit disarray: “[N]either California nor the Ninth Circuit has identified a persuasive reason
for treating professional speech as a unique category that is exempt from ordinary First
Amendment principles. We do not foreclose the possibility that some such reason exists. We
need not do so because the licensed notice cannot survive even intermediate scrutiny.” Id. at
2375.
44. See, e.g., Estate of Spencer v. Gavin, 946 A.2d 1051 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008).
45. See, e.g., Rudolph v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 800 F.2d 1040 (11th Cir. 1986); Robert
Wooler Co. v. Fidelity Bank, 479 A.2d 1027 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984).
46. See, e.g., Simkin v. United States, 715 F.2d 234 (2d Cir. 1983).
47. See Lewis v. Cowen, 165 F.3d 154, 166 (2d Cir. 1999) (“A well-respected senior
policymaking employee with public speaking responsibilities who objects to a position held
by his superior frequently may be forced to choose between speaking out in favor of his
supervisor’s program and keeping his job, or voicing his personal opinion and perhaps losing
his job.”). Consider, for example, President Roosevelt’s dismissal of the chairman of the Board
of Directors of the TVA for making “grave and libelous charges of dishonesty” and for then
“refusing to give the Chief Executive the facts, if any, upon which he based his charges of
malfeasance.” Franklin D. Roosevelt to the Congress (March 23, 1938), in Message from the
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decision of a teacher at a state school to sanction a student for failing to take an
examination or to produce an assigned paper?48 Should questions in state mandatory
tax forms receive elevated judicial scrutiny?49 Should the disclosures required by the
Truth in Lending Act (TILA)50 be subject to elevated judicial review under the First
Amendment?51
Examples like these suggest that NIFLA’s abstract equation of compelled speech
with the kind of content-based regulation that triggers elevated judicial scrutiny is
seriously deficient. It may make sense in some circumstances, but there are plenty of
contexts where almost no one would agree that it makes any sense at all. This is
because the values that compelled speech doctrine seeks to protect are threatened in
some circumstances, but not in others. Without a convincing analysis of these values,
we cannot distinguish the former from the latter except by reference to the kind of
hypothetical intuitions that we have been exploring. Until we have carefully
canvased these intuitions, it is the height of foolish intemperance to pronounce an
abstract, context-independent rule that purports to prejudge the myriad of delicate
situations in which state-mandated speech may occur.
What makes NIFLA’s proposed rule especially ill-considered is that it essentially
compresses complex issues of compelled speech into the simple tiers-of-scrutiny
framework that in the early 1970s began to infiltrate First Amendment doctrine from
the distant field of Equal Protection jurisprudence.52 Tiers-of-scrutiny analysis
typically instructs a court to examine the over- or under-inclusiveness of a state
regulation, as well as the strength of the state interest that supports it. The latter is of
course always important to assess, but it is difficult to explain why the former should
be placed at the heart of First Amendment doctrine.

President Relative to Removal of Arthur E. Morgan, SEN. DOC. NO. 155, 75TH CONG. 3D. SESS.
(1938), at iii. In deciding the constitutionality of the dismissal, no court even considered the
applicability of the First Amendment and the doctrine of compelled speech. Morgan v. Tenn.
Valley Auth., 115 F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1940).
48. Nicholl v. Olens, No. 1:17-CV-4518-AT, 2018 WL 8949446 (N.D. Ga. 2018);
Jemaneh v. Univ. of Wyo., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1281, 1295 (D. Colo. 2015).
49. Gillispie v. Sherlock, 929 P.2d 199 (Mont. 1996); Dep’t of Revenue v. Hoyt, 8 Or.
Tax 367 (1980).
50. Truth in Lending Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968).
51. Courts to date do not seem to think there is any First Amendment issue with enforcing
the disclosures required by the TILA. See, e.g., Turner v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 537
F.2d 1296 (5th Cir. 1976); Bradley v. Marshall Bros. Lincoln Mercury, 698 F.2d 1286 (5th
Cir. 1983).
52. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S.
105, 124–28 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring). See, e.g., Police Dep’t of the City of Chicago
v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972). Fallon, supra note 38, at 1278–79, suggests that some elements
of strict scrutiny, like the necessity of a compelling government purpose, were actually initially
developed in the First Amendment context. In this Article, however, I am specifically focusing
on tiers-of-scrutiny as a feature of doctrinal analysis. The contemporary dominance of this
form of analysis is evident in an article like Clay Calvert, Is Everything a Full-Blown First
Amendment Case After Becerra and Janus? Sorting Out Standards of Scrutiny and Untangling
“Speech as Speech” Cases from Disputes Incidentally Affecting Expression, 2019 MICH. ST.
L. REV. 73 (2019).
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The Court initially began to scrutinize laws for over- and under-inclusiveness in
the context of enforcing the Equal Protection Clause, where the methodology roughly
sought to vindicate the value of equality by insuring that like persons would be
treated alike.53 But the core of the First Amendment involves quite different values,
which is why classic First Amendment decisions before the 1970s did not think to
use tiers-of-scrutiny analysis.54 Instead, like Justice Jackson in Barnette, these
decisions directly evaluated the justification for state regulations in light of the First
Amendment values potentially impaired by those regulations. NIFLA’s blithe
indifference to the specific values at issue in compelled speech cases is compounded
and encouraged by its recourse to tiers-of-scrutiny doctrine, which does not require
any encounter at all with the particular substantive values protected by the First
Amendment.
Recent scholarship has begun to articulate constitutional values that may be at
issue in compelled speech cases. These values range from the autonomy of the
speaker,55 to the autonomy of the audience,56 to the distortion of the marketplace of
ideas,57 to the chilling of speech,58 to the “epistemic harm” of undermining
professional knowledge,59 to government shifting the cost of its own expression onto
private parties.60 Scholars have identified values that range from avoiding
misattribution61 to preserving the free formation of the thinking subject;62 from the
freedom from being obliged to foster another’s message63 to preventing an
“unwanted connection” with the views of another.64 None of these distinctively First
Amendment values can be recognized and explored when doctrine asks only whether
a government regulation is narrowly tailored.
Even a cursory review of contemporary literature would suggest that the range of
possible justifications for compelled speech doctrine is enormous. We may perhaps
sort through possible candidates by subjecting them to the same hypothetical
examples we used to evaluate NIFLA’s proposed rule equating compelled speech
with invalid “content-based regulation.” We can immediately see that particular
justifications will have bite in some circumstances, but not in others. Take, for
example, the “thinker’s” rationale propounded by Shiffrin, which is so attractive and

53. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
54. Consider such classic cases as Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Brandenburg
v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941); Cantwell
v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Schneider v.
Irvington, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); and Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
55. Corbin, supra note 3, at 1298.
56. Id. at 1300.
57. Id. at 1294.
58. Id. at 1293.
59. Joseph Blocher, Free Speech and Justified True Belief, 133 HARV. L. REV. 439, 491
(2019).
60. Amar & Brownstein, supra note 2, at 7.
61. Greene, supra note 3, at 1491.
62. Shiffrin, supra note 15.
63. Greene, supra note 3, at 1493.
64. Id. at 1482.
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so convincing in the context of Barnette. Try to apply that rationale in the context of
medical malpractice.
There are doctors who sincerely and authentically hold false scientific beliefs.
Stella Immanuel, for example, who is a licensed MD in Texas, claimed with complete
conviction that hydroxychloroquine cured COVID-19.65 If Dr. Immanuel had given
this advice to a patient, and if she had been sued for medical malpractice, I would be
bold to say that she could not have invoked a First Amendment defense. She would
not have been permitted to say to an injured patient: “My advice to you was, to quote
Holmes’s immortal language in Abrams v. United States,66 ‘an experiment, as all life
is an experiment. Every year if not every day we have to wager our salvation upon
some prophecy based upon imperfect knowledge.’”67 In the eyes of the law, a
licensed MD is not entitled to force patients to wager their salvation on the
experiment of a professional’s wayward opinion. The marketplace of ideas is
incompatible with the competent practice of medicine.
This is because law constructs physician-patient relationships to underwrite
patients’ warranted expectations of competent medical care.68 Law both sanctions
incompetent medical advice and compels the provision of necessary advice; in the

65. Dickens Olewe, Stella Immanuel—The Doctor Behind Unproven Coronavirus Cure
Claim, BBC NEWS (July 29, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-53579773. Dr.
Immanuel also believes that certain medical conditions are caused by “witches and demons.”
Id. The mere fact that someone is licensed to practice medicine does not guarantee that they
are scientifically competent.
66. 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
67. Id. at 630.
68. Hence the breathtaking inanity of Thomas’s invocation of the “marketplace of ideas”
in the context of professional speech. Thomas writes:
Further, when the government polices the content of professional speech, it can
fail to “‘preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will
ultimately prevail.’” Professionals might have a host of good-faith
disagreements, both with each other and with the government, on many topics in
their respective fields. Doctors and nurses might disagree about the ethics of
assisted suicide or the benefits of medical marijuana; lawyers and marriage
counselors might disagree about the prudence of prenuptial agreements or the
wisdom of divorce; bankers and accountants might disagree about the amount of
money that should be devoted to savings or the benefits of tax reform. “[T]he
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market,” Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919)
(Holmes, J., dissenting), and the people lose when the government is the one
deciding which ideas should prevail.
NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2374–75 (citation omitted). I surely hope that Justice Thomas’s
physicians do not conceive their medical practice along the lines he theorizes in NIFLA. Of
course, there are contexts in which we do wish to preserve a marketplace of ideas for the
exchange of professional views. Professional and scholarly journals are a good example. But
professional speech, meaning the professional advice given by a professional in the course of
professional treatment, see Claudia E. Haupt, Professional Speech, 125 YALE L.J. 1238, 1247–
48 (2016), is certainly not one of these contexts. The law constructs such professional
relationships to protect the reliance interests of patients and clients. It does not construct such
relationships to embody the value of caveat emptor, as does the marketplace of ideas.
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context of malpractice, the distinction between restrictions on physician speech and
mandated physician speech is irrelevant.69 Each is routinely regulated. A physician’s
personal claim to “freedom of thought and freedom of conscience”70 is overridden
by the obligation to provide competent medical care. The personal beliefs of Dr.
Immanuel are immaterial. What matters is only that she provide care that meets
relevant professional standards.
Without question malpractice law instrumentalizes physicians to achieve its goal
of ensuring competent medical care.71 If we are to speak strictly, law defines the role
that physicians must play so as to achieve this goal, and it then demands that
individual physicians fulfill the obligations of that role. If Dr. Immanuel were to be
sued for malpractice, the case might well disclose a great gulf between her sincere
personal beliefs and the reiterated, compulsory, instrumentalized requirements of a
physician’s legally defined role. Despite the obvious potential for such disjunction,
courts in malpractice cases do not weigh a doctor’s First Amendment interests in
being an independent thinker against a patient’s interests in receiving competent
medical treatment.72 Nor do they permit doctors to experiment on patients in order
to protect the marketplace of ideas. Nor for that matter do they ask if particular
judgments of medical malpractice are narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest.
In this simple, commonplace example, we can see that the constitutional value of
developing and protecting an independent mind, which Shiffrin convincingly puts at
the heart of Barnette, is largely absent from the legal construction of a physician’s
appropriate role. The role is impersonal because it is designed for instrumental
reasons. It does not matter that the rules of professional malpractice compromise the

69. The law would equally sanction Dr. Immanuel if she affirmatively advised her
patients that hydroxychloroquine would prevent COVID-19, or if she failed to caution against
the actions of a patient whom she knew was acting dangerously in the false belief that
hydroxychloroquine prevented covid.
70. Blasi & Shiffrin, supra note 17, at 433–34.
71. Shiffrin, in true Kantian fashion, is quite distressed whenever the law treats persons
in this instrumental fashion. “Using the speaker merely as a means for disseminating and
saturating the environment with the government’s message fails to exhibit respect for
individual dignity and intellectual independence.” Blasi & Shiffrin, supra note 17, at 435.
72. This is not to say that in certain circumstances doctors may not assert First
Amendment interests against state regulation. For example, if the state were to pass legislation
requiring physicians to advise patients that hydroxychloroquine offers complete protections
against COVID-19, doctors should, in my view, be able to sue for a violation of their First
Amendment rights. See, e.g., Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A First Amendment
Analysis of Compelled Physician Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 939, 952–90; ROBERT C. POST,
DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND A FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE FOR
THE MODERN STATE (2012). Properly speaking, however, the First Amendment rights of
physicians in such a context are a vehicle for asserting the interests of patients in receiving
competent medical advice. In this sense they would be analogous to the commercial speech
rights of speakers, which have traditionally been conceived as serving the interests of listeners
in receiving information. See supra notes 3–9 and accompanying text. The personal autonomy
interests of the physician might be at stake, however, if a state were to require physicians to
recite the Republican Party platform before treating a patient. This is because the regulation
imposes on the doctor the requirement of compelled ideological speech that by hypothesis has
nothing to do with the professional role of the physician.
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autonomy of a doctor. It does not matter that they force a doctor to speak words with
which she may personally disagree. It does not matter that they may force the doctor
to be connected with others in ways that she finds personally objectionable. It does
not matter that they chill what the doctor might otherwise personally wish to say.
The marketplace of ideas, which NIFLA somehow puts at the heart of professional
speech, is irrelevant. All that matters is that the rules of professional malpractice
establish a doctor-patient relationship incentivized to provide competent medical
care. That is why we almost never see any mention of the First Amendment in the
myriad of malpractice cases decided by courts that involve compelled professional
speech.
Doctor-patient relationships are certainly not the only area of social life where the
law constructs instrumentally justified and legally enforced social roles. It happens
in the construction of most professional behavior, like that of lawyers or accountants.
It also routinely occurs in what I have elsewhere described as “managerial
domains.”73 These are the swaths of behavior managed by government organizations
in order to fulfill organizational missions.
Courts are a good example. Judges are authorized to manage speech within their
courtrooms in ways that establish and enforce the proper roles of witnesses, lawyers,
and parties, and these roles are in turn defined in terms of the overall mission of the
court to dispense justice.74 That is why, in the second example we discussed, judges
routinely compel speech within courtrooms without the interference of any First
Amendment doctrine. The question in such cases is whether a judge has properly
interpreted the substantive rules that define the proper roles of witnesses, lawyers,
and parties.75 Difficult constitutional questions do arise, however, when we must
define the limits of the managerial domain of courts, as for example when judges, in
order to preserve the integrity of their mission, seek to reach out and constrain the
ability of lawyers to speak to the public outside of a courtroom.76
The implication of this perspective is that compelled speech doctrine will be of
limited value in the many cases that involve government institutions. Government
institutions must instrumentally define roles to advance their goals. Legal
enforcement of these roles will depend upon their institutional justification. If an
employee of the social security administration objects to the ruling of her superior
and chooses to speak to clients in ways that are true to her authentic personal beliefs

73. Robert Post, Between Governance and Management: The History and Theory of the
Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1713 (1987).
74. See, e.g., In re Hawver, 339 P.3d 573 (Kan. 2014); Mezibov v. Allen, 411 F.3d 712
(6th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1111 (2006); Heckard v. Murray, 428 P.3d 141 (Wash.
Ct. App. 2018).
75. We might note that Rule 11 sanctions strictly constrain the marketplace of ideas
within a courtroom. FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
76. See, e.g., Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030 (1991). Gentile is in my view
most profitably analyzed as about the boundary between public discourse and the managerial
domain of the Court. See Post, supra note 73, at 1788–97. Analogous to Gentile are the many
cases where courts must explore the limits of the managerial domain of schools, both for
employees, see Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968), and for students. See
Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v. B.L., 141 S. Ct. 2038 (2021); J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist.,
650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc).
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but that contradict the official policy of her bureau, the First Amendment will offer
no solace when she is disciplined.77 Employees can be required to mouth official
policy when speaking as employees, whether or not it conforms to the independent
dictates of their own minds. The constitutional value of the independent thinker
identified by Shiffrin does not play a significant role.
Of course, Barnette itself also involves a managerial government institution.
Barnette is about compelled speech within public schools, which routinely restrain
and compel speech in ways deemed necessary to accomplish their mission of
education.78 Schools regularly prevent students from communicating in ways that
would disrupt their pedagogical mission,79 and they regularly require students to
speak in ways that serve that mission—whether through homework, paper
assignments, recitations, or examinations.80 Much of this compelled speech seems
superficially to have the same properties that Shiffrin finds objectionable in
Barnette—it is manipulative, repeated, and designed to overpower the autonomy of
individual students. Think, for example, of how frequently schools require students
to memorize and recite the multiplication tables, or the alphabet, or the Gettysburg
Address.
Shiffrin distinguishes these many examples by invoking the “important
constitutional distinction . . . between compulsory education and compulsory
inculcation.”81 She is right to do so. But of course the distinction raises the obvious
question of how we can distinguish one from the other. On most accounts, the
difference between education and inculcation derives from a substantive account of
the proper ambitions of education.82 If we believe that education must aspire to
produce students with a competent independence of mind, we might distinguish
between the compulsion necessary to internalize the multiplication tables, and the
compulsion necessary to internalize a respect for the flag. Internalization of the
former, we might say, is necessary for a truly competent independent mind to
function, but internalization of the latter forecloses precisely that independence.

77. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
78. Aaron Saiger, Deconstitutionalizing Dewey, 13 FIU L. REV. 765 (2019); Robert C.
Post, The Classic First Amendment Tradition Under Stress: Freedom of Speech and the
University, in THE FREE SPEECH CENTURY 106 (Lee C. Bollinger and Geoffrey R. Stone eds.,
Oxford University Press 2019).
79. See, e.g., Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); Hazelwood Sch.
Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988); Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
80. Larson v. Burmaster, 720 N.W.2d 134 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006); Sutton v. Stony Brook
Univ., No. 18-CV-7434(JS)(ARL), 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 206999, at *39 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 4,
2020).
81. Blasi & Shiffrin, supra note 17, at 441. Blasi and Shiffrin write, “Educational methods
convey information, arguments, ideas, and views to children, often by means of required
exercises. But they do so in ways that explicitly implicitly treat the child as a distinct,
independent mind whose genuine understanding is the objective.” Id. This does not seem to
me a convincing account of how schools seek to impress the multiplication tables on young
students. It certainly does not describe how I experienced my school’s requirement that I
memorize the tables.
82. See, e.g., MATTHEW W. FINKIN & ROBERT C. POST, FOR THE COMMON GOOD 82–100
(2009) (discussing the distinction between education and indoctrination as constructed within
the law of academic freedom).
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I should note that the Court has at times articulated a theory of education that
requires schools precisely to aim at producing students who can think for themselves.
In Tinker v. Des Moines School District,83 for example, the Court struck down school
censorship on the ground that it was incompatible with producing this mental
independence. “In our system, state-operated schools may not be enclaves of
totalitarianism,” the Court said. “In our system, students may not be regarded as
closed-circuit recipients of only that which the State chooses to communicate. They
may not be confined to the expression of those sentiments that are officially
approved.”84
I should also note, however, that in other decisions the Court has adopted a very
different theory of education. On more than one occasion it has upheld the censorship
of student speech on the ground that
The role and purpose of the American public school system were well
described by two historians, who stated: “[P]ublic education must
prepare pupils for citizenship in the Republic. . . . It must inculcate the
habits and manners of civility as values in themselves conducive to
happiness and as indispensable to the practice of self-government in the
community and the nation.”85
Barnette is plainly a decision in the tradition of Tinker. Perhaps, then, we can best
understand Barnette as assessing the constitutionality of the mandatory pledge of
allegiance in light of a particular understanding of the mission of public education.
That mission is to create democratic citizens who can exercise competent
independent judgment. It is a mission that certainly seems to underlie Barnette’s
soaring and memorable rhetoric: “If there is any fixed star in our constitutional
constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox
in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to
confess by word or act their faith therein.”86
Although this rhetoric is unforgettable, it also raises many conceptual puzzles.
Presumably Jackson believed that it was acceptable to impose an “orthodox”
understanding of the multiplication tables. Perhaps he believed that rote recitation of
those tables involves facts, rather than “opinion,” and so was compatible with
“intellectual individualism.”87 But surely the same could not be said about rote
memorization and recitation of the Gettysburg Address, or for that matter of any
poem that might be assigned in the English curriculum.88 If such assignments are

83. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
84. Id. at 511.
85. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986) (emphasis added). See,
e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S.
393 (2007).
86. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
87. Id. at 641.
88. See, e.g., James Weinstein, Free Speech and Political Legitimacy: A Response to Ed
Baker, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 361, 375–76 (2011) (“[I]t is inconceivable that the Barnette
Court (or any Court before or since) would have recognized the constitutional right of a public
school child to refuse to recite a poem that offended the child’s aesthetic sensibilities. (‘I’m
sorry Miss O’Grady, but being required to recite drivel such as “Stopping by Woods”
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constitutional, then it must be because they do not “force” students “to confess . . .
their faith.” They do not involve a pledge of adherence.89 But this explanation rather
sharply deflates the soaring rhetoric of the opinion and brings the decision down to
the rather prosaic ground of a substantive theory of proper education.
More importantly, however, it is important to note that although Barnette
proclaims constitutional values in universal terms, it advances values that have
constitutional purchase in only limited domains of application. So, for example,
Barnette instructs us that the state cannot prescribe what is orthodox in matters of
opinion, yet government routinely imposes liability on lawyers for malpractice for
producing incompetent opinion letters.90 And in these cases there is not even a
whisper of the First Amendment or of Barnette.
Ultimately, the compartmentalization of modern society functions to cabin the
constitutional values proclaimed by Barnette. We all occupy numerous different
social roles, and these roles are typically organized according to distinct logics. In
the context of freedom of expression, the effort to impose a single, universal
constitutional value—like independence of mind—will inevitably run headlong into
the highly differentiated social landscape that we actually inhabit.91 The distinct
social logics of that landscape tend to domesticate, if not emasculate, abstract
constitutional values. That is why, for example, no one would think to claim that a
President cannot seek to prescribe what is “orthodox” by firing a Secretary of State
who refuses to endorse the President’s policies.
Barnette’s special and generative power derives from the fact that it interprets the
educational mission of schools to accurately and eloquently chime with a
constitutional value that does actually define a major category of First Amendment
doctrine. What we have come to categorize as ordinary First Amendment
protections, like those against content- or viewpoint-based regulation, apply to what
I have called “public discourse,” which is the set of speech acts that courts view as
necessary for the formation of public opinion.92 As Chief Justice Roberts has
explained, a “vibrant public discourse . . . is at the foundation of our democracy.”93
Briefly stated, ordinary First Amendment doctrine is constructed according to the
following logic. Self-government is a fundamental constitutional value; democracy
is the form of government that embodies this value. Democracy in modern states is

disrespects my autonomy; I would, however, agree to recite one of Tennyson's better works.
Otherwise, please speak to my lawyer.’)”).
89. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 628. For a discussion, see Abner S. Greene, The Pledge of
Allegiance Problem, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 451 (1995). See Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley, 664
F.3d 865, 878–79 (11th Cir. 2011).
90. See, e.g., Montgomery Cnty. v. Jaffe, Raitt, Heuer & Weiss, 897 F. Supp 233 (D. Md.
1995); Petrillo v. Bachenberg, 655 A.2d 1354 (N.J. 1995); Taylor v. Riley, 336 P.3d 256
(Idaho 2014).
91. See, e.g., ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY,
MANAGEMENT 10–13 (1995).
92. See Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous
Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 601
(1990); Post, supra note 78, at 107–08.
93. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 373 (2010) (Roberts, C.J.
concurring).
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essentially “government by public opinion.”94 By ensuring that all can freely
participate in the creation of public opinion, the First Amendment protects the
constitutional value of “democratic legitimation,”95 which is the public’s sense that
it is indeed engaged in the project of collective self-determination. As the Court
announced in Citizens United v. FEC,96 “[s]peech is an essential mechanism of
democracy, for it is the means to hold officials accountable to the people. The right
of citizens to inquire, to hear, to speak, and to use information to reach consensus is
a precondition to enlightened self-government and a necessary means to protect it.”97
The First Amendment serves as the “guardian of our democracy”98 by casting
speakers, when they participate in public discourse, in the role of autonomous
sovereigns who are immunized from government control when they deliberate about
how to direct the ship of state.
Barnette interpreted the function of public education to be that of preparing
students to participate in these autonomous deliberations. Barnette insisted that
schools treat students in ways that would facilitate their becoming independent
thinkers, so that later in life they could exercise their democratic responsibilities as
sovereign citizens. As Barnette crisply asserts: “Authority here is to be controlled by
public opinion, not public opinion by authority.”99
The values asserted by Barnette thus chime with those that are used by the
contemporary Court to protect public discourse. And these values do indeed
proscribe compelled speech. The government cannot compel public discourse
because government would then be manufacturing the very public opinion to which
it is supposed to be responsive. Compelled public discourse contradicts the
foundational value of democratic legitimation because it alienates persons from the
very speech that is meant to underwrite their experience of self-government.
Notice that the prohibition of compelled speech within public discourse does not
follow from the application of “strict” or “intermediate” scrutiny, which are
indifferent not only to substantive First Amendment values, but also to the many
different social roles that persons must inhabit in modern society. The prohibition
flows instead from the specific values that the First Amendment is designed to protect
within public discourse. This implies that although the rule announced by NIFLA
may be correct within public discourse, it may have no application at all in other
contexts, like for example the professional practice of medicine. It should be
immediately obvious that the application of strict scrutiny to the abstract category of
compelled speech would make hash of everyday practices within schools or courts,

94. CARL SCHMITT, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 275 (Jeffrey Seitzer ed. & trans., Duke
Univ. Press 2008) (1928).
95. POST, supra note 72, at 1–25.
96. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
97. Id. at 339 (citation omitted).
98. Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 60 (1982); see James Weinstein, Participatory
Democracy as the Central Value of American Free Speech Doctrine, 97 VA. L. REV. 491
(2011).
99. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943). “We set up a
government by consent of the governed,” Jackson writes, “and the Bill of Rights denies those
in power any legal opportunity to coerce that consent.” Id. It is central to Jackson’s opinion
that he regarded the compulsory flag salute as “a ceremony so touching matters of opinion and
political attitude.” Id. at 636.
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where speech is routinely compelled as necessary to fulfill the constitutional
missions of education or justice.
We can now understand why the disclosures regularly compelled by the Truth in
Lending Act ought not automatically to receive elevated scrutiny. These
communications do not occur in public discourse, but in the realm of commercial
speech, which, as we know from Zauderer, is subject to very different constitutional
protections than public discourse.100 Even NIFLA was willing to endorse “the
Zauderer standard” for compelled commercial disclosures of “purely factual and
uncontroversial information about the terms under which . . . services will be
available.”101
The disclosures compelled by tax returns are also not public discourse. Yet they
pose something of a puzzle. We do not yet have a good analysis of the specific
constitutional values that might be threatened when the state requires us to file tax
returns. Perhaps the closest analogy might be compulsory testimony. But this
analogy is not perfect because the role of a witness is largely determined by the rules
defining the institutional necessities of a court system. There is no analogous
institutional mission to which we might turn to define and limit the distinct role of a
taxpayer.102
I certainly do not wish to deny the existence of the many generic First Amendment
values that excellent commentators have so far identified as implicated in compelled
speech cases.103 In any particular circumstance these values may be triggered and
influence the exercise of constitutional judgment. But because social roles and
institutions are so significantly constituted by the speech of those who inhabit them,
the functional needs of these roles and institutions will largely subordinate freestanding constitutional values when it comes to the regulation of speech. The point
is well illustrated in the various hypotheticals we have so far examined. This implies,
however, that to focus on the abstract doctrine of compelled speech may be to
examine the First Amendment through the wrong end of the telescope. In most
situations, how we regard compelled speech will be determined by the social roles
and institutions we wish to use the First Amendment to produce, rather than the
reverse.
We should understand clearly that social roles and institutions do not exist in
nature without human intervention. They are socially produced, through judicial
decisions as well as through other forms of social reproduction. Determining how to
characterize any particular speech act for First Amendment purposes is thus partly
performative; it contributes to the definition and boundaries of social roles and
institutions. A simple example might be the soldier in his bunk who writes his local
newspaper that his commanding officer is an incompetent sadist. If we characterize
the letter as public discourse, the soldier will be constitutionally immunized from
reprisal. His speech is protected because he is writing as a sovereign citizen. But if
we instead characterize the letter as a violation of appropriate military discipline,

100. See supra notes 5–10 and accompanying text; Post, Compelled Commercial Speech,
supra note 3.
101. NIFLA v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2372 (2018).
102. Cf. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
103. See supra text accompanying notes 55–64; Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and
Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2353 (2000).
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imposed by the army to achieve its mission of national defense, then the soldier might
well be punished for insubordinate speech. As courts characterize whether the soldier
has written the letter as a citizen or as a private in the army, so they will draw the
boundaries of the managerial authority of the military.
Many of the hottest debates in First Amendment jurisprudence can best be
understood as controversies about the categorization of speech acts. In NIFLA, for
example, we might ask how a court should categorize the notices required by
California. Should we classify these notices as the speech of the state itself? Or
should we instead regard them as the compelled public discourse of the CPCs? Or,
as a third possibility, ought we to categorize the notices as the kind of mandated
commercial disclosures that are commonplace in the world of public health services
providers? We might even adopt a fourth framework and conceive the notices as
simply government mandates that happen to impair the attempted public discourse
of the CPCs, in which case NIFLA does not present an issue of compelled speech at
all. It is merely an example of what happens when official regulations, taken for
presumably proper purposes, impair expression.
Notice that entirely different regimes of First Amendment doctrine apply to each
of these distinct frameworks of analysis. If we figure the required notices as
government speech, then we are told that “the Government’s own speech . . . is
exempt from First Amendment scrutiny.”104 If we instead imagine the notices as the
forced public discourse of the CPCs, then black-letter strictures against compelled
public discourse apply. “It is . . . a basic First Amendment principle that ‘freedom of
speech prohibits the government from telling people what they must say.’”105 If we
understand the notices to be the kind of ordinary mandated disclosures that often
accompany commercial transactions, then the “reasonably related” test of Zauderer
would govern.106 Finally, if we conceptualize the notices as state regulations taken
for legitimate reasons but having the effect of chilling public discourse, then
something like balancing would apply.107 Of course if we believe that the notices
were imposed for the purpose of undermining the public discourse of the CPCs, then
likely they are prima facie unconstitutional.108
How should we decide among these many different normative characterizations
of the facts in NIFLA? The women using the CPCs might justifiably expect that
California ensure that they not be misled by those offering health services to the
public. California in fact had good reason to believe that the CPCs were engaged in
deceptive marketing that induced women into believing that they would be offered
“medical services such as abortions.”109 Commercial speech doctrine generally takes
the point of view of consumers, giving government considerable leeway to protect

104. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n., 544 U.S. 550, 553 (2005); see Pleasant Grove
City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467–68 (2009).
105. Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, 570 U.S. 205, 213 (2013).
106. See supra notes 5–10.
107. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150
(2002). Notice that Watchtower conducts this balance differently depending upon whether the
chilled speech is public discourse or commercial speech.
108. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992); see infra note 113.
109. Chemerinsky & Goodwin, supra note 3, at 70–71.
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them from being misled by requiring the disclosure of factual information. This is
the principle that underlies Zauderer.
The CPCs, by contrast, likely regarded the compulsory notices as efforts to
undermine their attempts to convince women to respect unborn life. From the CPCs’
perspective, it is as if the state had imposed a kind of “fairness doctrine” on their
political outreach.110 First Amendment doctrine applicable to public discourse
generally takes the point of view of the speaker, protecting speakers from influences
that may chill or alter their speech.111 From the perspective of California, moreover,
the notices were likely a simple and convenient method for distributing information
deemed necessary to provide the public with relevant facts about state-supplied
services.
There is at present no known doctrine for adjudicating among these competing
perspectives, each with its own distinct constitutional consequences. It seems to me
plain, however, that the outcome of the case would have been much more cogently
justified if the Court had chosen to explain how it decided constitutionally to
characterize the California notices than it was by any of the doctrinal moves actually
made by the Court.
Speaking for myself, I find it implausible to conceptualize the notices as the
compelled speech of the CPCs, because the content of the notices is so obviously
attributable to California rather than to the CPCs.112 I find it more convincing to
imagine the mandated notices as state requirements that potentially undermine what

110. See, e.g., Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
111. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
112. I realize that classifying the notices as compelled speech might seem follow from the
holding of Wooley. But, as I have suggested, Wooley is itself rather problematic as a compelled
speech case. See supra text accompanying notes 18–22. The mere fact that one has been forced
to carry official notices on one’s property does not seem to me equivalent to being forced to
speak in one’s own name. If that were the objection, Maynard might equally have objected to
having to use any license at all that displayed identifiable information. I doubt that any court
would characterize the required display of a license with numbers and letters, simpliciter, as
compelled speech. What carries weight in Wooley is that the objectionable message was
overtly political and ideological. I can understand how a property owner might object to being
forced to post official signs saying, in what everyone recognizes as the state’s own voice, that
capitalism is liberating. See Greene, supra note 3. Whether this objection should sound in
compelled speech or in some other doctrinal framework, however, seems to me an open
question. In any event, the notices involved in NIFLA were not, as in Wooley, overtly political
or ideological. They simply recited true facts. In that sense, they raise issues that are more
analogous to the case of objecting to simple information on a license plate than to issues raised
by Wooley. I doubt very much if the CPCs could make a compelled speech claim against the
required posting of accurate information required by California Proposition 65 if it were
alleged that they were offering customers water improperly infused with lead. See Safe
Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§
25249.5–25249.14 (West 2019); Mateel Env’t Just. Found. v. Edmund A. Gray Co., 9 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 486 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003); Consumer Cause, Inc. v. Smilecare, 110 Cal. Rptr. 2d 627
(Cal. Ct. App. 2001). Seen from this perspective, NIFLA may not involve a question of
compelled speech doctrine at all. It might be simpler instead to conceptualize the case as
involving government requirements that interfere with and undermine messages that the CPCs
wished to communicate.
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the CPCs regarded as their own efforts to persuade women to repudiate abortions.113
On this account, the case should ultimately turn on whether the speech of CPCs
should constitutionally be characterized as public discourse or as commercial speech,
a question which effectively turns on whether the CPCs should be regarded as
speakers advancing a public cause or instead as providers of health services to the
public. California manifestly regarded the CPCs as the latter; the Court just as clearly
regarded the CPCs as the former.114
Many of the women using the CPCs no doubt regarded them as health care
providers; the CPCs no doubt understood themselves as participants in public
discourse. The issue is whose perspective should control the application of First
Amendment doctrine. The Court plainly had a choice, which illustrates the
dependence of First Amendment doctrine on the normative characterization of social
practices. NIFLA makes crystal clear how constitutional doctrine sometimes depends
on an interpretation of social facts that precedes the application of the doctrine. This
does not make such interpretations lawless, but it does illustrate the dependence of
doctrine upon powerful but implicit normative characterizations.
The choice framed in NIFLA should give pause to the present trend of scholarship
about compelled speech. That the very same communicative acts can be
characterized in such entirely different ways suggests that compelled speech is not
itself a natural category, protected by its own distinctive constitutional values. This
in turn implies that scholarly inquiry is better directed to the question of how
compelled speech intersects with distinct social practices, and how a court may
recognize and categorize these practices. The perception and valorization of these
practices correspond to our lived experiences of distinct social roles and institutions.
I suspect that this is what Holmes might have meant when, appealing to the “felt
necessities of the time,” he said that “The life of the law has not been logic: it has
been experience.”115 His well-worn aphorism might well inform the thrust of
contemporary compelled speech scholarship.

113. In contrast to Thomas’s opinion for the Court, Kennedy’s concurring opinion in
NIFLA is all but explicit that the purpose of California’s notices was to illegitimately
undermine the public discourse of the CPCs. Kennedy characterized the case as an effort by
government “to impose its own message in the place of individual speech, thought and
expression. . . . [T]he history of the Act’s passage and its underinclusive application suggest a
real possibility that these individuals were targeted because of their beliefs.” NIFLA v.
Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2379 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
114. From the perspective of the Court, therefore, the decisive constitutional question
should have been the extent and nature of the intrusion on the CPCs’ speech. This analysis is
not helped by the Court’s characterization of the notices as content-based regulation.
115. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 5 (Mark DeWolfe Howe, ed. 1963)
(1881).
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